
















Abstract Personalized Genomics companies (PG; also called ‘Direct-to-Consumer 
Genetics’) are businesses marketing genetic testing to consumers over the Internet.  While 
much has been written about these new businesses, little attention has been given to their 
roles in science communication.  This paper provides an analysis of the gene concept 
presented to customers and the relation between the information given and the science behind 
PG.  Two quite different gene concepts are present in company rhetoric, but only one features 
in the science.  To explain this, we must appreciate the delicate tension between PG, 












1.0 Introduction The  concept  of  the  gene has  a  long  and multifarious history.    It  has been pronounced ‘dead’  (Gray  1992)  only  to  be  later  revived  (Neumann‐Held  1999),  heralded  as  the hallmark scientific concept of the 20th century (Fox Keller 2000), then declared obsolete in light of more precise biological taxonomy (Fogel 2000), all the while being redefined countless  times  for  countless purposes.    In  spite  of  this  controversy,  the  gene has not disappeared  from  view.    Spurring  and  capitalizing  on  the  public  fascination  with genetics,  a  new  type  of  commercial  enterprise  has  recently  arisen  offering  genetic testing directly to consumers.  Several such Internet‐based companies are now thriving.  These  Personalized  Genomics  companies  (sometimes  called  ‘Direct‐to‐Consumer Genetics’ or ‘Retail Genetics’) have aroused a great deal of attention from governments rushing  to erect  regulations,  from  journalists  sensationalizing scientific advancements, and, perhaps most importantly, from consumers eager to partake in the gains of modern science.  Amid all of this excitement, it is important to pause for a moment and examine the  concept  that  is  central  to  Personalized  Genomics  (PG).    I  believe  it  is  prudent  to determine what, precisely, the ‘gene’ in Personalized Genomics really is and what it can purportedly do.   Scientific  concepts  in  commercialized  science  are  an  important  topic.    These concepts are powerful and  their effects are wide‐reaching.   For many, popular  culture and  the media  have  long  been  the  only  sources  of  education  about molecular  biology and genetics  (Bates 2005).   Yet  information  from these sources  is rarely  in‐depth, and has  been  hotly  criticized  (Kua  et  al  2004).    PG  is  a  new  source  of  information  about genetics, one which customers may view as more reliable than other sources (compare Bates  2005  and Kaufmann  2012).    It  is  therefore  prudent  to  determine what  sorts  of knowledge about genes and genetics the public is liable to receive from PG.  Studies have already  shown  that most  customers  view  PG  as  a  source  of  knowledge  about  disease (McGuire et al. 2009) and  that many  intend  to use knowledge gained  to  inform health decisions  (Kaufmann 2012).    Though  customers  report  a high‐degree of  confidence  in their  understanding  of  PG  science,  that  confidence  may  be  misplaced.    Leighton  and colleagues (2012) report that customers’  frequently misinterpret PG results  in spite of self‐assessments  to  the contrary.   This  is worrying when we consider  that over 1/3 of prospective customers expect results to be equivalent to medical diagnoses (McGuire et al. 2009).   Customers’ poor  comprehension of PG  science has been attributed  to both  the extremely high literacy demands of PG websites (Lachance et al. 2010) and the public’s generally  poor  understanding  of  statistics  (Leighton  et  al.  2012).      I  suggest  that examining  the  concept  of  the  gene will  shed  new  light  on  the  nature  of  this  problem.  Further, misapprehension  the  science,  via misunderstanding of  the gene,  is  a problem 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that extends beyond the scope of PG tests themselves.  Knowledge of genetics will go on to inform future decisions about and assessments of genetic and biological claims.  Lay conceptions of genetic causation have implications for topics from racism and prejudice (Condit  2011;  Bates  2005),  to  more  everyday  topics  like  fairness  in  sport  (eg.  see exchange in Cohen 2008).  Beyond these practical implications, epistemic consequences are  a  virtual  certainty  as  false  beliefs  about  genetics  form  the  basis  for  yet  further misunderstanding.  Evaluating the quality of information on offer is therefore important for both customers’ understanding of PG tests themselves, and for their understanding of science, more generally. 
 
2.0 Personalized Genomics Although  there  are  a  number  of  types  of  business  to  which  ‘Personalized  Genomics’ might  refer,  I will  focus  only  on  one  such  business model  here.    These  are  ‘complete’ genome  scans,  so‐called  because  they  assess  large  samples  of  DNA  from  across  the genome and forward predictions about a wide range of traits.  I have chosen to focus on three companies as representative of this class: Navigenics, 23andMe, and deCODEme.    2.1 THE SCIENCE BEHIND PERSONALIZED GENOMICS Personalized  Genomics  companies  operate  almost  exclusively  online.    Although  some companies have attempted to sell their products in drug store chains, these moves have been unsuccessful (see Lakhman 2010).  Testing kits, which range in price from $200 to over $2000, generally contain a saliva tube or cheek swab.  Once the DNA is mailed and processed,  the  consumer  accesses  test  results  via  the  company  website.    In  some instances, an ongoing fee is charged for continued access and genetic counselling. From the customer’s saliva sample, PG companies are able to extract DNA. The DNA is scanned for a pre‐determined set of data points, which are interpreted in light of massive  DNA‐trait  correlation  databanks.    These  databanks  have  been  established thanks  to a new type of  study known as  the Genome Wide Association Study  (GWAS).  Older  and  more  labour  intensive  genome  mapping  techniques  required  hypothesis‐driven research.  This forced researchers to go into gene‐trait correlation studies with a target genetic marker in mind, searching for just that marker (called the ‘candidate gene approach’).    It  is  now  possible  to  sample  an  extremely  wide  array  of  markers  from across  the  genome,  approaching  GWAS  without  a  priori  hypotheses  about  which markers will be important (Hunter & Chanock 2010).  In this spirit, PG tests and GWAS proceed with up to two million data points per subject.  This process begins by focusing in on the areas in which human DNA typically varies; these are locations where a single nucleotide has been substituted for another, the results of copying errors at some point in  the  ancestry.    There  are  an  estimated  11million  such  Single  Nucleotide
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Polymorphisms (SNPs)  in  the human genome (Kruglyak 2008),  though not all of  these are known.    It  is  thus only a subset of all extant SNPs  that are  included  in  tests, and a much smaller subset of those SNPs are actually known to confer any information about traits.1  SNPs known  to have meaningful  correlations  (negative  or positive) with  traits are  known  as  ‘risk  alleles’,  and  the  degree  of  association  is  known  as  the  ‘risk association’.  These data furnish the basis of PG assessments.  With knowledge of which risk  alleles  a  customer  possesses  PG  companies  search  for  specific  risk  alleles, determining relative risk for a number of different traits. For each trait, the PG customer receives three figures:  (1) the population frequency of the trait;  (2) the subjective risk assessment;  (3) the adjusted risk.2    Population frequency (1)  is the percentage of the population that will have the trait  in question.    Usually,  this  population  is  not  the  general  population,  but  that  population narrowed by gender and/or ethnicity, where possible.3   The average risk of Ulcerative Colitis,  for European white males,  for  instance,  is 0.77%.   This means  that 7.7  in 1000 members  of  this  population  will  develop  Ulcerative  Colitis  in  their  lifetime.    The subjective risk assessment (2) is the sum total of risk associations from the risk alleles present  in  the  customer.    If,  for  instance,  the  customer  has  a  risk  allele  with  a  risk association of 1.3, then he is at a 30% increased risk relative to the population mean (1).   Multiplying the population risk (1) by the subjective risk (2) gives us the total adjusted risk    (also  called  the  ‘absolute  risk’)  (3).   To apply  this  to  colitis,  this  customer would have an adjusted risk of 1.001% [0.77(1.3) = 1.001].   (1) 0.77% (2) 1.3 (3) 1.001% That  means  that  ~10  of  1000  males  of  European  descent  with  this  risk  allele  will develop Colitis. 
                                                        
1 It is interesting that PG companies use the number of SNPs included in their tests as marketing tools.  
Some boast of using 2 million where others used only 1.5.  Since only a few thousand of those SNPs 
confer any information, the gross amount of SNPs tested is little indication of test quality. 
2 Some companies omit (2), requiring you to infer the subjective risk, or omit (3), requiring you to 
calculate adjusted risk.  
3 There are some interesting and important questions about the degree to which this is accomplished.  
Many ethnic groups are not represented in the GWAS studies on which PG results are based.  See 
(Mountain et al., 2007). 
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Customers  are  provided with  lists  of  various  traits  and  conditions  along  with information  about  any  risk  alleles  where  applicable.    Descriptions  of  traits  are  also provided.  Reporting results in this fashion ought to provide the customer with an idea of her risk, relative to the risk of members of the population of which she is a part.  2.2 PROBLEMS FOR THE PG APPROACH When  research  first  began  into  SNP‐trait  correlations,  the  hope  was  that  they  would uncover  the  genes  responsible  for  nearly  all  heritable  illnesses.    Although  genetic variants implicated in many traits have been uncovered, the magnitude of these results have been disappointing.  As one researcher comments, “common [genetic] variation is packing  much  less  of  a  phenotypic  punch  than  expected”  (Goldstein  2009,  p.1696).  Often,  traits with estimated high heritability have been only partially accounted  for  in GWAS  results.4    The  risk  associations  yielded  by GWAS have  often  been  so  small  that when used by PG they confer marginal increases in estimated risk and are thus often too low to be of clinical value.  It is tough to pin down the precise average risk association used by PG, but most sources cite figures ranging from 1.1 to 1.5 (Hudson 2008; Hunter et al. 2008; McGuire & Burke 2008).  A risk association of this magnitude would increase one’s risk to between 10%  and  50%  above  that  of  the  regular  population.    To  put  this  in  perspective,  for  a disease with a population frequency of 10%, a risk‐assessment of 1.5 (on the high end of the  average) would  raise  the  person’s  personal  risk  to  15%.    That  is  not much  of  an increase, hardly enough to invoke a sense of urgency.  What type of intervention might be  available,  desirable,  or  necessary  for  a  15%  risk  that  is  neither  available  nor appropriate for a 10% risk?  Many of the behavioural changes recommended on the basis of small  increases in risk are behaviours that are recommended of the general public anyhow. Referring to this obstacle, one group of researchers warned, “until  the genome can be put to useful work,  [one  would  be]  better  off  spending  their  money  on  a  gym  membership  or  a personal  trainer”  (Hunter, Khoury et al. 2008).   Though  it may be  interesting  to know that you carry a marginal increase in risk for some trait or condition, the practical value of  that  information  is  often  quite  small.    John  P.  Ioannidis,  one  of  the  most  widely published commentators on GWAS, notes that many people may be unaware of the low clinical utility of these predictions, [T]he utility  of  the  genetic  tests  rests  on  the brittle  assumption  that  there  is  a very  specific  and  noncontestable  risk  threshold  that  leads  to  very  different action plans. (Iaonnidis 2009)                                                         
4 Perhaps the most discussed of these is height, which is estimated to be 80-90% heritable, but for 
which SNPs account for only 5%.  The issue of missing heritability is a complex one.  The poor risk 
associations discussed here are but a symptom of this greater problem.  On the problem of heritability 
estimates, see (Sesardic 2005).  On the problem of missing heritability, see (Maher, 2008). 
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Marginal  increases  in  risk  do  not  permit  any  change  in  recommended  preventive measures.    Unless  the  risk  associations  utilized  in  PG  can  drastically  increase,  it  is unclear that the results will translate into meaningful changes to clinical practice.   The  poor  results  offered  by  PG  tests  may  go  unnoticed.    Indeed,  customers demonstrate  a  propensity  to  overestimate  the  significance  of  the  results  they  receive (Leighton  et  al.  2012).    A  defender  of  PG  might  wonder  whether  some  utility  might come, if not from the results themselves, then from increased knowledge and awareness of genetics and molecular biology.  In the next section, I analyze the concept of the gene presented  in PG and ask whether  this  tuition compensates  for  the poor clinical utility, and,  perhaps  equally  importantly,  whether  it  may  contribute  to  or  counteract customers’ demonstrated ignorance of the nature of genetic risk.  
3.0 What and Where are the Genes in Personalized Genomics? PG websites, press releases, and advertising  feature the gene prominently. From video tutorials  to  terminology  sheets,  the  gene  crops  up with  considerable  frequency.   Note that  my  account  of  PG  reports  presented  above,  however,  the  term  ‘gene’  does  not feature once.  Indeed, risk is based on SNPs.  One can present the material, as I have, in such a way as to render the relationship between SNPs and genes an unnecessary part of  understanding  of  risk  reports.    Yet  PG  companies  make  the  gene  necessary  for understanding  the  science by  featuring  the concept  so prominently and by connecting DNA to risk via genes.  Customers will surely wonder just what genes are and what they can  do.    Whatever  the  gene  concept  at  work  in  PG,  we  should  find  evidence  of  this presented  on  their  websites,  written  in  the  information  provided  to  customers  and physicians,  and  embedded  in  their  scientific  practices.    Uncovering  information  about the gene concept on which PG relies will require first analysing the relationship between SNPs and genes,  then analyzing how SNPs and genes are taken to affect  traits, and the role accorded to variables other than DNA.   There are at least two points of contact for the gene in PG.  The first of these is in the science behind PG, the second is in the customer perception of genetics.  Examining the former will involve examining the technology and techniques on which the industry relies5;  the  latter  requires  an  examination  of  company  websites,  publications,  and                                                         
5 To be clear, we cannot access what the PG scientists really think genes are.  To access scientists’ inner thoughts isn’t possible.  The best we can do is to analyze the material they present to their customers and examine their scientific practices. How they actually conceive of and use the concept is beyond the scope of this sort of investigation.  For more on the epistemic and psychological barriers to reconstructing scientific concepts, see (Waters, 2004). 
  6 
customer  reports.    Whether  the  gene  presented  to  customers  aligns  with  the  gene concept used in PG science is an open question.    3.1 SNPS AND GENES To determine  the gene concept at work  in  the  collection of data,  it  is best  to begin by determining  how  genes  are  conceptualized  in  the  context  of  GWAS,  the  science  that features most prominently in PG practice.   PG companies are somewhat indiscriminate with regard to the selection of SNPs.  Roughly 57% of the trait‐associated SNPs identified by GWAS fall within protein‐coding DNA  (Hindorff  et  al.  2009).    By  including  some  variations  occurring  outside  of  these regions, GWAS are also capable of capturing risk allele correlations for traits affected by variations in other regions – sequences such as regulatory regions, for instance.   When SNPs falling in non‐coding regions are identified, the standard approach is to determine the  variant  in  a  protein‐coding  region  for which  that  SNP  is  an  indicator.    A  common suggestion  is  that we  treat  SNPs  as  ‘surrogates’  for  variants  in protein‐coding  regions (Hunter & Chanock 2010).6  The authors of a recent review of GWAS results suggest that we should not be  too quick  to assume that risk association  in a non‐coding SNP  is  the ‘true’  cause,  and  not  merely  an  indicator  of  the  ‘true’  cause  of  the  trait  in  a  protein‐coding  region  elsewhere  (Hindorff  et  al.  2009).    Similarly,  an  early  review  forecasting progress for GWAS reminds,  [M]ost  of  the  [correlating  DNA  sites]  are  more  likely  tagging  SNPs  than  the causal  sites,  so  it  is  not  clear  what  their  relationships  to  …  the  true  disease‐promoting variants are.  (Gibson & Goldstein 2007, p. 931)  Practice  is  thus  to  treat  SNPs  as  a  resource  for  probabilistic  claims  about  traits while assuming that they are indicative of a variation in a protein‐coding region that serves as the cause.   The SNP approach is grounded in a very typical notion of genes as protein‐coding DNA.  This view, typical among molecular biologists, is often called a ‘molecular gene’ (Waters 1994; Griffiths & Stotz 2007; cf. ‘nominal gene’ in Burian 2004).  Although this is a common view, it is worth noting that the molecular gene is not the only category of gene concept  in use.   A more general view of  the gene  is  in use among branches of population genetics, biometrics, and plant breeding.   This concept requires no physical referent, molecular or otherwise.  It acts as an instrumental variable, useful for tracking                                                         
6 This likely owes, at least in part, to early Linkage Disequilibrium (DL) mapping, a technique for 
mapping polymorphisms, which evolved into contemporary GWAS.  Early DL approaches, relying 
on restriction fragment length polymorphisms and familial transmission data, were predicated on the 
fact that polymorphisms shared by individuals related ancestrally are often surrounded by shared 
alleles at nearby loci.  The polymorphism is thus treated as a marker for the ‘true’ source of the 
trait(s) in question.  In contemporary studies, however, samples are not restricted to family lines, and 
thus researches ought not assume so readily that a polymorphism is indicative of shared alleles.  Yet 
this caveat may have been neglected, and surrogate assumption adopted erroneously, in contemporary 
GWAS (see Kruglyak, 2008). 
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Taken together, this appears to be much the same as the SNP‐gene relationship assumed in GWAS.  Given the difficulty in obtaining this explanation, however, it is doubtful that the customer would decipher this.10 deCODEme  is  perhaps  the  least  forthcoming  about  the  relationship  between SNPs and genes.  Though their ‘Genetics Explained’ guide implicitly identifies genes with both  chromosomes  and  the  whole  genome,  and  uses  ‘gene’  as  an  umbrella  term  for multiple possible SNPs at a given locus, they also offer an explicit definition of the gene. [Genes]  are  relatively  small  segments of  chromosomes, where  the  sequence of DNA nucleotides encodes a recipe for making a protein.11 (deCODEme, 2010)  They also explain what is done when a SNP is identified as a risk‐allele.    Usually,  further  research  is  needed  to  find  out  whether  this  SNP  or  another nearby is the true genetic cause of the characteristic  in question.12 (deCODEme 2010)  Again, this explanation seems to fit with the SNP‐gene relationship and molecular gene conception used in PG science.  3.2 SNPS, GENES, AND TRAITS Given  this presentation of  the SNP‐gene  relationship, how  is  the  relationship between SNPs,  protein‐coding  genes,  and  human  traits  presented?    For  the  answer  to  this question, I think we can turn first to 23andMe.   23andMe  provides  a  “Keywords  for  Genetics”  information  sheet, which,  like  the other companies, gives a typical molecular gene account.  Each  kind  of  protein  tool  has  its  own  blueprint,  or  gene,  located  in  the  cell's nucleus.    Genes  can  be  turned  on  or  off  in  different  cells  at  different  times. (23andMe 2010b)  Further down the sheet, we find the following explanation of SNPs:  A SNP is a site in the genome where a single DNA ‘letter’ often differs from person to  person.  Some  (but  not  all)  SNPs  appear  to  be  associated  with  variation  in different people’s phenotypes. (23andMe 2010b)  On their own these definitions tell us little about the mechanism linking SNPs to traits; but when we  examine  the  diagram  by which  they  are  accompanied,  it  becomes  clear how SNPs are meant to fit.  The diagram depicts a gene as a section of DNA, a molecular gene.  Within that gene falls a SNP, where a Guanine nucleotide has been substituted for a  Cytosine.    That  SNP  results  in  the  translation  of  a  different  protein  from  the  gene,                                                         
10 The difficulty in piecing together information about the science will only be compounded by the 
extremely high reading level required of PG users.  Lachance et al (2010) found that the reading level 




which resides on the bitter taste region of the tongue.  Proteins coded without the SNP are  amenable  to  broccoli,  and  those  coded with  the  SNP  are  not.    Relying  heavily  on imagery  of  DNA  and  proteins  as  structure‐specific  shapes,  they  depict  the  protein  as either broccoli shaped or not.   The result of  the SNP is a structurally different protein, which, according to the diagram, is not broccoli shaped so the bitter taste receptors on the tongue are protected from the broccoli.  The result is broccoli enjoyment.  Explaining this phenomenon, the account continues: In  this  example,  a  SNP  in  the  gene  encoding  the  protein  that  responds  to  bitter flavors can have C [cytosine] or G [guanine] variants – leading to a big difference in phenotype! (23andMe 2010b)  For want of a single guanine, enjoyment of broccoli is lost.    The  broccoli  example makes  clear  that  ‘gene’  refers  to molecular  gene,  and  that SNPs  are  taken  to  reside within  those  genes.    This  latter  claim  is  false  in many  cases since  SNPs may  occur  anywhere  on  the DNA.    It  is  likely  that  they  chose  the  broccoli example because it is one of the rare cases where a single SNP can be linked directly to a change in a protein and a change in a trait.  SNPs affect genes either directly, by changing the  coding  sequence,  or  indirectly,  perhaps  by  affecting  a  regulatory  region.    But  this latter  possibility  is  not  communicated  to  the  customers.    Two  things  are  clear:  (1) ‘Genes’ are protein‐coding genes.   (2) SNPs are important because of their relationship to mutations in those genes; those mutations affect protein synthesis and this in turn is where differences in traits emerge.  Simplified information about the location of SNPs is not  on  its  own  problematic,  but  insofar  is  it  is  used  to  communicate  inaccurate information  about  genetic  causation,  it  should  be  a  source  of  concern.    The  use  of simplified  examples  is  not  uncommon.    In  science  communication,  where  the information  to  be  communicated  is  often  immensely  complex,  simplifications  are  a necessity.   Yet we must be careful  that  the simplification does not come at  too great a cost.  In this instance, it may.   Assertion (2) is not entirely incorrect.  There do exist rare cases in which a single nucleotide variation in a molecular gene directly determines phenotype via a change in protein structure.   Yet this is not the only mechanism behind trait determination.   This depiction represents the etiology of a minority of traits; but the broccoli example sheet does not  comment  on  the  question  of  how much  trait  variation  is  caused  in  this way.  Does  the direct action of SNPs account  for all, most,  some, or  little variation?    Is  there any way a SNP would not lead to a phenotypic change?  There is nothing in the depiction that  would  provide  an  answer  to  these  important  questions,  let  alone  prompt  a customer to ask them.   Similar  characterizations  of  the  SNP‐gene‐trait  relationship  can  be  found  on  the deCODEme site. Small differences in the sequence of DNA nucleotides of a particular gene can lead to differences in the structure and behavior of the proteins they encode. It is these 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differences,  in  turn,  that  account  for  the  variable  characteristics  of  the  people around you.13 (deCODEme 2010)  Elsewhere on the site, a similar sentiment is expressed more explicitly: [T]he  fact  that our DNA can change,  given enough  time,  explains why we are all different in size, shape, color and many other characteristics.  Such differences are the  result  of  the many  SNPs  that  have  arisen  in  the  DNA  of  our  species  and  its predecessors.14 (deCODEme 2010)  Unlike  the 23andMe example,  these  two statements do not  leave open  the question of how much variation is caused in this way.  Rather, they seem to imply quite strongly that 
all  of  your  traits  are  the  direct,  unmediated  result  of  SNPs.    A  different  gloss  appears elsewhere: 
Most of our  features,  internal and external are determined or  influenced  in  some 





instances  the mechanisms within which protein‐coding  genes  operate  are  determined by external influences, not just the presence of a given nucleotide sequence in the DNA.  In  the  sections  of  their  web  pages  explaining  the  SNP‐gene‐trait  relationship,  these companies make no mention of non‐DNA factors and  their role  in  trait production.    In fact,  the  broccoli  example  from  23andMe  seems  to  have  been  selected  specifically  to avoid  discussion  of  other  factors.    Finally,  some  of  these  selections,  particularly  the broccoli example and the first deCODEme quote, seem to suggest an inevitability about gene‐trait causal links.   This  first  concern  is  ultimately  one  about  the  extent  to which DNA  architecture and organization is taught to customers.  It may be easier to couch everything in terms of coding regions rather than explain the role of other DNA regions, too.  This does not seem to translate into a problem for the scientific practice of PG companies, given that they  do  test  for  SNPs  falling  in  non‐coding  gene  regions,  even  if  this  is  not communicated to customers.   The failure to mention the importance of mutation other than  SNPs  is  worth  considering.    To  the  extent  that  customers  hope  to  gain  an understanding of biology, epidemiology, and genetic causation, this presents a problem, one to which I will return in the final section of this paper.  This problem is compounded by the second and third concerns, which have more radical implications for the way in which genetic  causation  is understood by  customers.    In  the next  section,  I  examine a different  message  contained  in  PG  information,  albeit  one  originating  from  very different parts of the webpages.  In these sections, factors other than DNA are discussed in a manner quite contradictory to the message just examined.   3.3 SNPS, GENES, AND TRAITS … IS THAT ALL? From  the  investigations  reported  in  the  previous  section,  one  might  expect  that  PG companies make no mention of non‐DNA factors at all.  When explaining the science on which they rely, they seem to imply quite strongly that SNPs in protein‐coding DNA are the only important causal factor behind traits.   Yet the reports customers receive from PG companies relaying test results are strikingly different. Consider the following:   Environmental  factors  can  also  affect  our  visible  traits,  either  negatively  or positively (deCODEme 2010)  A similar quote can be found on every risk assessment page of a 23andMe report: Environmental contributions to a trait may be small (earwax type) or large (type 2 diabetes). Environmental factors range from things that are more or less under one's  control,  such as diet  and obesity,  to  things outside one's  control,  such as childhood influences or geographic location. (23andMe 2010)  Statements  like  these  can  be  found  as  footnotes  to  risk  assessments,  or  under  FAQ sections  about  why  genes  cannot  be  used  for  diagnosis  or  whether  genes  are  one’s destiny.  In most cases they are not easy to come across, often requiring linking off main 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pages or finding hyperlinks embedded within risk assessments.   That these statements are difficult to find while appearing at odds with the information about SNPs, genes, and traits reviewed above should not go without notice.  A customer who happened to find one  group  of  information  but  not  the  other might  be misled,  and  customers who  find both will  likely  be  confused.    Given  this  juxtaposition,  combined with  the  difficulty  in finding  statements  in  which  the  role  of  environment  is  emphasized,  it  is  perhaps unsurprising that when we dig a little deeper we find that this emphasis on other factors is rather hollow.    When viewing the risk‐assessments from several PG companies, one is now able to review a list of known environmental risk factors affecting a given trait.  Often these are quite general, nearly always  including smoking, age,  ethnicity,  gender,  and weight.  Little indication is given as to the relative importance of any of these factors, or how a customer might  go  about determining  the  extent  to which one of  these  factors  affects her.    Customers  cannot  turn  to  original  research  for  this  information,  as  sources  are rarely provided.   23andMe does have a link labelled  ‘sources’ at the end of the list, but these  are  actually monozygotic  twin  studies  used  to  calculate  heritability  figures,  not sources  for  the  risk  factors  themselves.    One  could  certainly  forgive  a  customer  for failing  to  notice  that  these  studies  were  not,  in  fact,  source  research  for  the environmental  risk  factors.    deCODEme  provides  sources,  but  only  a  minority  of  the time.   In most cases the customer is left with little information about the nature of any additional risks conferred. This trend is repeated throughout PG websites and reports.  The contribution of environmental  influences  is  acknowledged  explicitly,  but  is  not  utilized  in  risk‐assessments and is not presented in detail sufficient for the customer to understand the environmental impact herself.   23andMe’s  reports  each  contain  a  heritability  report,  presented  as  a  graph representing  the  genetic  versus  environmental  components  of  a  trait;  or,  “how much genetics contributes to a trait or the risk of a condition” (23andMe 2010).  The chart for heart  attack,  for  instance,  reads  ‘38‐57%  attributable  to  genetics’.    These  figures,  the result of monozygotic twin studies, are problematic for a number of reasons.  First, these studies  assess  the  traits  of  identical  twins  to  determine  how  frequently  traits  are attributable  to  their  shared  genetics,  and  how  often  to  their  (presumably)  different environments.  This methodology has been subject to a great deal of scrutiny and should be viewed with a touch of scepticism (see Hawkes 1997).  Second, it is unclear that these studies provide an estimate of the ‘genetic versus environmental’ components of a trait.  It  is more  likely  that  the  ‘genetic’  components measured  actually  indicate  heritability, which may be reflective of modes of transmission other than that captured in nucleotide sequence (Sesardic 2005; Fox Keller 2010).  Finally, the customer might think that these ‘genetic v. environmental’  figures had in some way been taken into account during the 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calculation of her risk assessment.    Indeed, there is no clear indication to the contrary.  Yet environmental risk factors are not factored into the risk assessment.   One further case deserves attention.  Each of the three PG companies emphasizes the  role  of  family  history  in  determining  susceptibility  to  diseases.    Navigenics  has  a large  section  of  their webpage  explaining  that  family  history  provides  a  great  tool  to which  PG  scans  can  greatly  contribute.16    23andMe  and  deCODEme  offer  ancestry analyses, the predictive virtues of which each company extols.   On Thanksgiving (U.S.), which also happens to be ‘National Family History Day’ (U.S.), Navigenics issued a press release,  addressed as an open  letter  to  the  surgeon general.   The  letter  celebrated  the value of collecting family history health information.   At a time when families are gathered, we are reminded that our family’s health history offers  a window  into our own health, providing  insight on  some of  the heritable factors that may predispose us to particular health conditions.  Family history  –  particularly  gathered  through  the  online  platform  –  is  an  easy, accessible means  by which we  all  can  take  greater  control  over  our  health.    A seemingly small step, family history could provide us with a foundation on which we  can  collectively  build  a  new  era  of  disease  prevention.    (Navigenics  2010, November 23)  This  information  is  all  correct.   The  internet  is an excellent means by which  to  collect family history information, and family history  is a powerful tool for disease prediction.  The  latter  is  precisely  why  standard  clinical  practice  for  assessing  many  traits  and conditions begins with a  simple  family history;  for generations  this was  the only  such metric  available.    Today,  in  the  midst  of  genetic  testing,  family  history  remains  a powerful  tool  for  predicting  risk  for many  diseases  from  diabetes  to  various  cancers.  There  are  well‐established  models  of  familial  risk  associations  based  on  heritability patterns that can be used by clinicians and patients.    The  utility  of  family  history  is  no  accident.    Some  of  the  reasons  behind  the predictive  power  of  family  history  are  now understood.    Of  course  one  reason  is  that disease‐causing  nucleotide  variants  are  heritable.    But  there  are  other  reasons,  too.  Many  epigenetic  disease  risk  factors,  such  as  methylation  patterns,  are  inherited  in predictable familial patterns, as are behaviours, traditions, diet, and habitat.  All of these may  confer  risks  for  different  diseases  and  traits.    Importantly,  much  of  the  risk information  conferred  by  familial  assessments  is  not  captured  in  a  SNP‐based  genetic test.    That  these  three  companies  so  publically  endorse  the  value  of  knowing  one’s family  history  is  laudable.    What  is  surprising,  however,  is  that  none  of  these  PG companies incorporates family history data into the calculation of risk assessments. Nor are any mechanisms provided for customers to make these assessments themselves.17                                                           
16 http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/genetics_and_health/family_history/ 
17 Some recent work has shown just how fruitful (though difficult) it can be to include clinical metrics, 
like family history, into risk assessments relying on DNA.  See (Ashley et al., 2010). 
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PG repeatedly acknowledges the importance of variables for trait prediction, yet does  nothing  to  incorporate  those  variables  into  risk‐assessments.    An  interesting question  is  whether  customers,  steeped  in  PG  literature  about  family  history  and environment, are aware that no such information impacts the predictions they receive.  3.4 WHAT MESSAGE DO CUSTOMERS GET? It  is not clear what  the take‐home message  for PG customers  is  intended to be.   There are two distinct versions of genetic causation presented.  In each case, ‘genes’ are quite clearly molecular genes.  Yet the etiological structure within which those genes operate receives two very different presentations.  The discrepancy lies in the level of autonomy given  to  the  gene  in  genetic  causation.    In  the  first  version,  coming  from  information about SNPs, genes, and  traits, genes are autonomous determiners of  traits.   This view, which  appears more  frequently  on web  pages  and  in  informational  literature,  videos, and tutorials, emphasises the role of SNPs in determining traits by generating variation in proteins.  The second version, arising from clauses in risk‐assessments about the role of  environment  and  from  public  praise  of  family  history,  features  a  less‐autonomous gene.   On  this view, genes are  important, but other variables are  important,  too.   This take on genetic causation closely resembles what philosopher Paul Griffiths (2006) calls the ‘informational gene’, according to which molecular genes contain information about a trait, which is either permitted or denied by latent features of the environment. These two views are related insofar as the informational gene is a weak form of determinism.  Though  certainly  not  without  problems  (see  Griffiths’  2006  discussion),  the informational  gene  is  far  better  represented  in  scientists’  thinking  about  genes.  The deterministic approach, on the other hand, has very few,  if any, proponents within the academy.  While it is unsurprising that the deterministic gene is absent in PG science, it should come as some surprise that it is present in PG rhetoric. The  difficulty  inherent  in  reconciling  these  two  presentations  of  genetic causation  is  striking.    Are  protein‐coding DNA  autonomous  causal  agents,  or  are  they working with  the  environment?    The  answer  cannot  be  ‘both’.    It  is  impossible  to  fit environmental  influences  into  the  picture  of  SNP‐driven  genetic  causation  outlined  in the  broccoli  diagram.    Perhaps  the  motive  behind  these  two  very  different characterizations is that each appeals to a different view of genetic causation extant  in the  population.    While  many  people  view  genes  as  discrete  sections  of  DNA  acting autonomously  to  effect  phenotype,  there  are  likely  others  who  understand  that  the environment plays a role as well, opting for a more holistic view of genes as the system of  DNA,  environment,  and  development.    Persons  of  either  persuasion  could  find something to latch onto within the pages of PG sites.     It  is  certainly worth  comment  that  the  locations  of  these  two  views  suggest  a possible  rhetorical  strategy.    A  customer’s  first  encounter  with  PG,  perhaps  while 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browsing  the  sites,  reading  the educational  literature,  trying  to decide whether or not the $300 price tag is worth it, she will encounter the very deterministic presentation.  It is not difficult to see how PG companies would benefit from this view.  The more causal power  attributed  to  DNA,  the  better  the  predictions  forwarded  using  DNA.    If  the broccoli  diagram  is  taken  at  face  value  and  traits  are  thought  to  be  the  mechanistic result  of  SNP‐induced  changes  in  protein  structure,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  a  customer would fit chance or under‐determination into the picture.  The customer’s perception of the predictive power of PG tests would increase drastically.  In fact, believing herself to be in possession of knowledge of the precise mechanism behind genetic causation, she may approach her decision to purchase a  test with a great deal more confidence.    It  is only after she has purchased a test, of course, that she begins to receive the second story about  genetic  causation.   With  results  in  hand  and  decisions  to  be made,  she  is  now cautioned that genes are not her destiny; the environment plays a role, too! This is difficult to explain.  Why present this latter view, which after all is more representative  of  the  stance  of  the  scientific  community,  if  it  is  not  reflected  in  the science?   Literature on  lay attitudes  toward determinism may be  informative, here. As Celeste  Condit  (2009)  reports, members  of  the  public  have  been  found  hold multiple beliefs  about  genetic  causation,  some  deterministic,  others  more  holistic.    These different  sets  of  beliefs,  or  different  ‘mental  models’,  are  triggered  differentially  by different contexts and goals.  It is known, for instance, that members of the public will be highly deterministic when asked about the origins of disease, but far less deterministic when asked about the origins of behaviour (Condit 2011). Similarly, individuals with the goal of maintain health optimism may appeal to environment, while those maintaining fatalistic  beliefs  appeal  to  genetic  determinism.  Very  similar  results  were  found  by  a group of researchers studying patient interpretations of PG results (O’Neill et al. 2010).  What is puzzling is that people maintain and use these two models of genetic causation entirely  separately.    That  is,  they  hold  incompatible  views  of  determinism  and  gene‐environment interactionism, with no regard to the manifest inconsistency.  In any single context, beliefs appear consistent because only one mental model is used.  It is only on a protracted view that the inconsistency comes out.    Individuals appear to have taken in messages about the role of environment in genetic causation, but ignore that knowledge when it is inconvenient.     These two models of genetic causation roughly accord with the two views of the gene seen here.   With two views of  the gene on offer, subjects can pick whichever one suits  the context and their goals. Providing support  for both views of causation allows customers to cherry‐pick the account they require.  The way in which PG facilitates this psychological  phenomenon  is  unfortunate.    PG  provides  customers  with  putative justification  for  the  deterministic model.    The  broccoli  diagram  and  similar materials provide what appears  to be a molecular mechanism  for genetic determinism, allowing customers  to  continue  to  rely on  the determinist model, believing  themselves  to be  in 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possession  of  scientific  knowledge  in  its  support.    Yet  the  determinist  model  is scientifically untenable.  It is therefore likely to lead to poor decisions and further false beliefs. We should hope for a public that does not posses beliefs about determinism as a legitimate way of thinking about genetics.  The explanations provided by PG are a step in the wrong direction. 
 
4.0 Personalized Genomics and Academic Science It should come as no surprise that the risk associations utilized in PG are unacceptably low.    As we  have  seen,  the  calculation  of  risk  is  grounded  in  a  narrow  conception  of genetic causation that leaves no room for interactions between DNA, environment, and development.  When predictions are being provided for traits like diabetes and various cancers,  for  which  the  environment  plays  so  crucial  a  role,  surely  the  recognition  of systems of interacting causal factors is a more appropriate approach than one grounded solely in the DNA.  Indeed, PG companies themselves extol the virtues of taking such an approach!   If the emphasis on DNA and neglect of additional variables is a potential cause of PG’s  principal  scientific  shortfall,  then  why  is  the  importance  of  environmental information  frequently  acknowledged,  but  never  utilized?    One  possibility  is  that  it  is simply too difficult  to obtain data about customers’ environment; but I  think there are good reasons to partially discharge this excuse. Some environmental information is easily accessible to PG companies, yet is not obtained.   There is a wealth of environmental information, such as smoking behaviour, level  of  exercise,  ethnicity,  family  history,  and  geographic  location  that  we  know  is relevant  to  the  prediction  of many  traits.    All  of  this  could  be  obtained with  a  simple questionnaire.   In fact, customers have to fill out questionnaires about sex, name, birth date, etc. when they register for their PG results.   It would not be difficult to add a few more questions.  It might even be possible to get customers to input more direct indices of health such as geographic location, blood pressure, cholesterol, insulin levels, average heart rate, etc.  These are indices to which many health‐conscious persons have access.   Perhaps  the  critic might  respond  that  customers would never  take  the  time  to provide such data.  Thanks to an unlikely source, there is now strong evidence that this objection is incorrect.  A recent initiative by 23andMe demonstrates that customers are more  than  willing  to  answer  a  lot  of  additional  questions  about  their  health,  habits, traits, and wellbeing,  if they think it may improve the accuracy or quality of their tests (Eriksson  et  al.  2010).    Unfortunately,  the  questions  23andMe  has  chosen  to  ask  are largely  trivial  (eg.  Are  you  naturally  a  night  person  or  a morning  person?    Does  raw broccoli taste bitter to you?).  Collecting data via survey is an easy yet neglected way to obtain useful environmental variables. 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There is also some important information stored in the DNA sample itself, which needs  only  to  be  extracted.    The  saliva  samples  and  buccal  swabs  used  to  obtain customers’  DNA  contain  not  only  the DNA,  but  also  information  about  the  health  and nutrition of the individual.   Environmental  data  is  certainly  available  to  be  harvested;  whether  it  can  be easily  utilized  is  another  question.    A  second  possible  explanation  for  the  failure  to include  environmental  data  is  thus  that,  though  available,  it  is  difficult  to  use.  Interpreting  environmental  data  requires  established  trait‐variable  correlations.  Correlations between SNPs and traits are known because of GWAS, but no endeavour of comparable  scope  or  magnitude  exists  for  establishing  correlations  between environmental variables and traits.18   This  issue is beyond the scope of PG,  it concerns the  scientific  community  itself.    We  simply  have  not  seen  variable‐trait  correlation studies on the magnitude that GWAS have taken place. Why not?  It may be that funding for  this  type of  research  is  limited.    It may be  that  fewer researchers are  interested  in this type of research. It may be because environmental variables are less tractable than SNPs.    It  may  be  that  this  research  is  viewed  as  secondary  to  SNP‐trait  correlations.  Whatever the answer, this points to a curious gap in mainstream biological sciences and, by  extension,  an  unexpected  way  in  which  commercialized  science  may  rectify  that problem.   The fact that trait‐variable correlations have not been established does not mean that it is not possible.  In fact, PG companies are in an excellent position to do just that.  They  have  access  to  very  large  customer  populations  and  those  customers  have  a demonstrated willingness to provide large quantities of personal information (Eriksson et  al.  2010).    This  overcomes  the main  obstacle  to  any  large  variable‐trait  correlation study, which is the recruitment of willing subjects.  PG companies are also in the unique position  of  being  able  to  cross‐reference  environmental  data  with  genetic  data.    The volume  of  variable‐gene‐trait  correlations  that  could  be  established  is  great.  Unfortunately, no such work has yet been initiated.19     If it is not the case that environmental information is difficult to obtain, and if PG companies have the power to create the infrastructure to utilize that information, then why doesn’t this happen?  This is a difficult question to answer.  I suggest two possible explanations.    On  the  one  hand,  it  may  be  that  PG  companies  truly  believe  in  the predictive power of DNA.  Perhaps PG, like many researchers (see Hunter, Altshuler, et al.  2008),  are  holding  out  for  larger  pools  of  GWAS  data,  or  better  mechanisms  for                                                         
18 In the wake of criticism of GWAS, some EWAS (Environmental-wide association studies) have 
been suggested.  Yet these have not been funded or pursued with anything like the enthusiasm of 
GWAS.  See (Pate, 2010; Turkheimer 2012) 
19 This may be set to change, a new company, Personalis, promises to integrate whole-genome scans 
with clinical risk information (family history, behaviour, etc.).  It will be interesting to watch 
whether, if successful, Personalis prompts other PG companies to follow suit, as I predict. 
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translating  GWAS  research  into  clinical  practice,  which  will  yield  stronger  SNP‐trait correlations.   Yet  it  is difficult  to  reconcile such a belief with  their public emphasis on environmental variables, and it  is hard to imagine that they see no benefit in including such data.   I  think  a  more  plausible  explanation,  one  that  highlights  the  importance  of examining  commercialized  science  as  distinct  from mainstream  science,  is  that  these companies have no prerogative or precedent  to  take environmental data  into account.  Increases in the predictive power of their assessments are not being demanded by the market and it would run contrary to PG’s interests qua business to implement any such changes.    The  cost  of  this,  balanced  against  prospective  returns,  is  simply  too  high  at present  for  a  for‐profit  enterprise  to  bear.    PG  companies  are  still  attracting  flocks  of customers,  they  are  still  receiving  attention  in  the  press,  and  they  are  still  raising impressive  amounts  of  capital  from  investors  (see  23andMe  2011,  Jan.  7;  Navigenics 2010, Feb. 2).  PG companies are for‐profit enterprises, not academic researchers.  Their goal is not necessarily to determine the best metric by which to predict traits; it is not to provide the best results to customers; it is not to operate in a way that is consistent with the concepts,  laws, and maxims of academic biology.   Their goal it  is to earn profit and expand the market.  If profit and predictions overlap, all the better, but the former must come first.   This  is not  to say  that  the  incorporation of environmental  factors  is not on  the distant horizon.  Now that more and more people are receiving scans, PG needs to find ways  to  keep  those  customers  coming  back  while  at  the  same  time  attracting  new clients.    If  it  became  apparent  that  one  company,  by  including  environmental  data  in their  screens,  forwarded  predictions  with  markedly  stronger  risk‐associations,  and perhaps with a better track record of  identifying genuine health concerns (though this latter possibility would be difficult  to demonstrate) surely  that company would see an increase in sales.  Profit and better predictions would overlap.  Other companies would not be far behind.  Yet switching business models in this way is not yet mandated by the market.  Consumers do not seem to care that the risk‐assessments they receive are low.  They may not even notice.  Until the market demands it, I do not think we should expect a radical upswing in the amount of environmental data utilized.  PG appears to benefit from the gene concepts presented.  The longer customers are able to retain deterministic ideas, the longer they will seek these tests in the face of evidence  of  their  poor  utility.    Until  potential  customers  become  aware  that  the predictions  they receive could be  improved by the addition of more variables,  there  is no incentive for PG companies to do so.   The interesting flip‐side of this, however, is that if this does happen, then PG companies could help effect a conceptual change within the public perception of genes, genetics, and traits. 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